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Certification of Class Actions in Louisiana
Kent A. Lambert*
In the familiar mantra of the American adversarial system, the trial court
* serves as "a neutral umpire, charged with little or no responsibility for the factual
aspects of the case or for shaping and organizing the litigation for trial."'
Within this system, the enforcement of rights and obligations is the responsibility
of individuals who, guided by personalized considerations of cost versus benefit,
are the sole arbiters of what does and does not come before the courts.
Thus, the American civil justice system by definition rejects any doctrine that:
[W]ould substitute for the traditional restraints familiar to the profession
a social welfare theory placing less emphasis than has been customary
upon the frugal use of the legal process and more emphasis ... upon the
use of courts as social agencies to set aright whatever is out of joint.'
While this approach has not always been the rule in Louisiana, whose civilian
ancestry once provided for a much more proactive judiciary, since the adoption
of the civil jury trial in Livingston's 1805 Practice Act, Louisiana has been
firmly committed to it.
The one (evolving) exception to the passivity of the American judiciary and,
therein, the professed absence of social engineering within American courts, has
been the class action. Not only has this relatively new procedural mechanism
overrun, Kudzu-like, much of the landscape of civil litigation within this country
in only a few decades, it has with equal rapidity come to represent a powerful
force guiding the evolution of numerous facets of the nation's substantive law,
including securities law,3 antitrust law" and, of course, tort law.
Indeed, as is painfully apparent in the context of mass-tort litigation, the
class action has spawned radical leaps in the substantive law that often have more
to do with the stakes of the litigation than any jurisprudential doctrine or
legislative pronouncement. As the Fifth Circuit recently opined:
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An attorney with the Commercial Litigation Group at the New Orleans office of Phelps
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various insurers and lenders involved in so-called CPI class action suits filed in Louisiana and
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I. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281,
1286 (1976); see also Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration
of Justice, 35 F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964) ("[I1n America, we take it as a matter of course that a judge
should be a mere umpire, to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the game, and that
the parties should fight out their own game in their own way without judicial interference.").
2. Chemer v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. Mass. 1962).
3. Consider the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
4. As evidenced by the recent authorization for state and FCC panens patriae antitrust suits.
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In the context of mass tort class actions, certification dramatically
affects the stakes for defendants. Class certification magnifies and
strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims. Aggregation of claims
also makes it more likely that a defendant will be found liable and
results in significantly higher damages awards.
In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certification creates
insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual
trials would not. The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents
too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse judg-
ment is low. These settlements have been referred to as judicial
blackmail.'
It is, perhaps, somewhat ironic that Louisiana, whose judiciary started out
far more proactive than those of her sister states, would today represent one of
the most conservative forums with respect to the use (or abuse) of class actions
as a mechanism for playing Robin Hood, both within particular cases and with
respect to entire fields of substantive law. Whether this will continue to be the
case in Louisiana is now very much an open question, as the state finds itself at
a unique crossroads.
The evolution of class action procedure in Louisiana has in fact been
somewhat stilted, an occurrence which is somewhat unremarkable as the class
action has no civilian forebear and, therefore, has always been more a creature
of the jurisprudence than of legislation.' Indeed, the introduction of the class
action to Louisiana law was entirely a matter of jurisprudential fiat.'
5. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
With respect to allowing class counsel to "notify" potential class members of the existence of the
class suit, Justice Scalia observed the following:
There is more than a little historical irony in the Court's decision today. "Stirring up
litigation" was once exclusively the occupation of disreputable lawyers, roundly
condemned by this and all American courts.... But in the age of the "case managing"
judicial bureaucracy, our perceptions have changed. Seeking out and notifying sleeping
potential plaintiffs yields such economies of scale that what was once demeaned as a drain
on judicial resources is now praised as a cutting edge tool of efficient judicial administra-
tion. Perhaps it is. But that does not justify our taking it in hand when Congress has not
authorized it. Even less does it justify our rush to abandon (not only without compulsion
but without invitation) what the Court depreciatingly calls the courts' "passive role" in
determining which claims come before them, but which I regard as one of the natural
components of a system in which courts are not inquisitors of justice but arbiters of
adversarial claims.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 181, I0 S. Ct. 482, 492 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
1 6. See, e.g., Eric Stephen Valley, Comment, Louisiana's Class Action: Judge-Made Law in
a Mixed Civil-and-Common-Law Jurisdiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1205, 1213 (1987); see also Robert
S. Rooth, Note, Civil Procedure--Class Actions in Louisiana-The "Common Character" of the
Right Sought to be Enforced, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 692, 692 (1976).
7. See Executive Comm. of French Opera Trades Ball v. Tarrant, 113 So. 774 (La. 1927)
(allowing members of unincorporated association to sue "collectively"), cited by La. Code Civ. P.
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The evolution of the class action in Louisiana culminated with the enactment
of the Louisiana Class Action Statute of 1960, a fascinating piece of reactive
legislation based upon the 1937 formulation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, governing class action procedure in the federal courts. Unfortunately,
although Rule 23 would be amended just six years later,' it would be nearly four
decades before Louisiana's legislature would revisit its own version of that rule.
Finally, however, on July 10, 1997, Louisiana took a significant-if perhaps too
ambitious-step towards "modernizing" the Louisiana class action, introducing
several significant refinements based upon the post-1966 version of Rule 23.
The instant article attempts to address only one aspect of this new regime
(although admittedly an important one): class certification. In an attempt to
provide context and depth to the discussion, considerable attention has been given
to both the state of Louisiana law concerning certification prior to July 10,
1997, 9 and modern practice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
As courts begin to construe the recent amendments to Louisiana's class
action rules, it is hoped that they will pay careful attention to the hard won
experience of the federal judiciary before turning our courts into laboratories for
lawyer-driven social policies. It is the principal ambition of this article to
provide a few educated insights into those experiences within the context of the
state's existing case law.
I. INTRODUCTION TO CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE IN LOUISIANA
A. Background
Class actions in the Louisiana courts are governed by Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure articles 591-97, '* which until July. of 1997 loosely tracked
art. 591 cmt. (a). Cf. Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 Colum. L.
Rev. 609, 611 (1971) (discussing the common law origins of the class action procedure).
8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (1966).
9. 1997 Louisiana Act No. 839, section 3 provides that the amended articles shall apply only
to actions filed on or after July 10, 1997, making both the old and new versions of the relevant Code
articles pertinent for present-day litigators.
10. These articles were amended as of July 10, 1997. Prior to their amendment, the pertinent
articles provided as follows:
Art. .591. Prerequisites
A class action may be instituted when the persons constituting the class are so numerous
as to make it impracticable for all of them to join or be joined as parties, and the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the members of the class is:
(1) Common to all members of the class; or
(2) Secondary, in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce it, and
a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce the right.
Art. .592. Representation
One or more members of a class, who will fairly insure the adequate representation of all
members, may sue or be sued in a class action on behalf of all members.
La. Code Civ. P. arts. 591-92 (1960).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 as it read prior to its amendment in 1966.
By Act No. 839. (1997), Louisiana has now amended its class action rules to
track almost verbatim the post-1966 version of-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23. Not surprisingly, then, to understand both the new and old versions of
Louisiana's class action statutes, one must first appreciate the evolution of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
B. True, Spurious, and Hybrid Class Actions
To set the stage for the Louisiana Class Action Statute as enacted in 1960,
careful attention must be given to the prior version of Rule 23. Under that
rule, envisioned at the time of its enactment as a refinement of Federal Equity
Rule 38,12 class actions were divided into three categories based upon the
substantive character of the right sought to be enforced by or against the class.
These classes, each of which presupposed a class of persons too numerous for
II. Prior to its amendment in 1966, Rule 23 read as follows:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly
insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is (I) joint, or
common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce
that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; (2) several,
and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific
property involved in the action; or (3) several, and there is a common question of law or
fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
(b) Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action brought to enforce a secondary right
on the part ofone or more shareholders in an association, incorporated or unincorporated,
because the association refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it, the
complaint shall be verified by oath, and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder
at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved
on him by operation of law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a
court of the United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have
jurisdiction. The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff
to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders
such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the
reasons for not making such effort.
(c) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
If the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given
only if the court requires it.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (amended 1966).
12. Federal Equity Rule 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912). reads as follows:
When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a
class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the whole.
See also 1849 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 438, § 119.
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their joinder to the action and adequate representation of that class within the
action, were defined as follows:
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.'3
These three categories have since become known as, respectively, the "true,"
"hybrid," and "spurious" class actions."
The following passage from Wright, Miller & Kane's Federal Practice &
Procedure provides an instructive summary of how the courts treated these
categories of class actions:
A "true" class action was said to be one in which the right to be
enforced was "joint," or when it was "common," or when it was
"secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to
enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled
to enforce it." The meaning of these terms was never altogether clear.
"Joint," perhaps, is a familiar enough term. Its use in former Rule
23(a) paralleled the pre-1966 text of Rule 19(a), which required joinder
of parties with a "joint" interest. Thus, when parties had a "joint"
interest they all had to be joined unless they were merely "necessary,"
under former Rule 19(b), or unless they were so numerous that it was
impracticable to join all of them, in which case a class action might
have been brought under Rule 23(a)(1). This did not make a "joint"
interest any easier to define, but at least it made applicable the rather
considerable body of law dealing with that term in connection with
compulsory joinder.
The mention of a "secondary" right had reference to derivative
actions. The most familiar example of this category is the stockholders'
suit to redress a wrong done to the corporation. Another is a benefi-
ciary's suit to enforce the rights of the estate when the executor or
administrator refuses to do so.
The principal difficulty was caused by the inclusion of "common"
rights. The term "common" had not been used previously in connection
with the joinder of parties. It therefore is not surprising that the courts
and the learned writers had difficulty in defining when a right was
''common," so that the class suit was "true," and when it was merely
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (amended 1966).




"several," and the suit was therefore "hybrid" or "spurious." Accord-
ingly, the following situations show no more than that certain courts in
particular cases apparently considered the suit before them to be a
"true" class action under former Rule 23(a)(1).
"True" class actions in which a plaintiff was allowed to represent
a class included: an action by members of an unincorporated associa-
tion to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute; suits by members of a
labor union to enjoin race discrimination in collective bargaining
agreements or to enjoin the enforcement of a statute that would deprive
them of the right to bargain collectively; a suit by owners of undivided
fractional interest in minerals and royalties; a suit by numerous
manufacturers to restrain defendants from fraudulently using a trade
name in which they had a joint interest; a suit by the beneficiary of a
trust on behalf of all beneficiaries to have diverted trust funds restored
to the trust estate; an action by holders of collateral trust notes for
restoration of the trust fund; and a suit by members of a craft for
protection of seniority rights.
In the popular terminology, all class suits that were not "true" were
either hybrid" or "spurious." These types of action were alike in that
the claims urged were "several" rather than "joint" or "common" as was
the case with the "true" class suit. The distinction was that in the
"hybrid" action, as contrasted with the "spurious" action, the object of
the proceeding was the adjudication of claims that did or might affect
the specific property involved in the action. One court put it this way:
If the rights of the individual plaintiffs are separate causes of
action and they have no right to a common fund or to common
property, the class action at bar is a "spurious" one. If, upon
the other hand, the individual plaintiffs having individual
causes of action have also a right to a common fund or in
common property, the class action may be "hybrid."
This seemingly easy distinction was complicated by the further
observation of the court in the case quoted from that a "spurious" class
action might be turned by circumstances into a "hybrid" class action.
The court gave the example of a suit by a number of individuals against
a corporation that fraudulently induced them to buy its stock. This, the
court said, would be a "spurious" class action. But if the corporation
subsequently became insolvent, and plaintiffs were compelled to look
for redress to a common fund in the hands of a receiver, then the action
would become "hybrid."'"
15. 7A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1752 (2d ed. 1986); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Comments.
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At a much more basic level, the confusion that surrounded the construction
and application of prior Rule 23 can be traced to its reliance upon what has
variously been described as "jural relations" or "substantive privity" as the
mechanism for determining the propriety of a class suit." Thus, under the
original text of the Rule, cohesiveness and homogeneity of proposed classes were
defined in terms of the existence of a "general" or "common or joint" right, vis-
a-vis a "several" right. It would take decades before another approach, already
popular in other procedural contexts, would begin to pave the way for a much
clearer and more functional gate-keeping mechanism for class actions.
C. The Transactional Approach and the 1966 Amendments to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 23
In an effort to solve the problems with Rule 23 as originally enacted, the
Rule was given a complete overhaul in the 1966 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. As thus amended, the original Rule's rather abstract
criteria were replaced by more functional provisions, at least in a relative sense.
Paragraph (a) of the amended Rule now restates the traditional common law
prerequisites to any class action, to-wit: numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation. If the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met,
paragraph (b) of the Rule requires a second step in the analysis, pursuant to
which at least one of the three following grounds for a class action must be
shown to exist: (1) that separate lawsuits by each class member risks either (a)
imposing incompatible standards of conduct on the party opposing the class,
through inconsistent adjudications, or (b) impairing the interests of other
members of the class; (2) that the party against whom relief is being sought has
acted in a manner generally attributable to a class of persons, such that
declaratory or injunctive relief as to the entire class is appropriate; or (3)
questions of law or fact common to a class of persons "predominate" over
questions unique to individual class members and "on balance" a class action
represents the "superior" procedure for adjudicating the controversy. 7
These latter categories, intended to replace the amorphous classifications
under the Rule's earlier version, represent the most substantial change made to
Rule 23 in the 1966 amendment." Specifically, these categories, particularly
those found in 23(b)(3), abandoned the original Rule's focus upon the substantive
(or jural) relationships between class members in favor of a transactional
16. See James Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 307, 314 (1937).
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
18. Significantly, in the ABA Section on Litigation, Report and Recommendations of the
Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195 (1 986), it was observed that even
these categories have engendered confusion, with the result that additional modifications have been
suggested, including, inter alia, a unified standard for all class actions merging FRCP 23(b)(l)-(3).
These recommendations have been viewed very favorably by the Advisory Committee and may
strongly influence proposed amendments to Rule 23 in the next few years.
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approach concerned with the presence of common issues of law or fact
predicated upon particular acts or omissions.
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
The requirements articulated under Rule 23(a) can be roughly summarized
as inquiring into whether there is a class in the first instance and, if there is one,
whether that class is properly represented in the litigation. Specifically, Rule
23(a) imposes four prerequisites, commonly referred to as the requirements of
impracticality, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.
a. Impracticality
A class must be large enough to make joinder impractical. 9 This requisite
is directly addressed to concerns of economy, ensuring that class action procedure
is used only when it will resolve numerous claims." Although often deemed
equivalent to an inquiry into the size of the proposed class, the impracticality of
joinder element in Rule 23(a) is intended to be broader than a mere numerosity
test." Thus, while it is probably correct that when the class is large, the class'
numbers alone should be dispositive, 2 other factors may also be relevant, such
that a relatively small class action may properly be maintained under Rule
23(a)(1) in certain circumstances.;' Other relevant factors include judicial
economy arising from the avoidance of multiple actions, the geographic
dispersion of class members, the size of individual claims within the class, the
financial resources of class members, and the ability of class members to sue
individually.2 ' In addition, where prospective injunctive or declaratory relief is
sought which might affect the rights or interests of as-yet unknown future class
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(aXI). In general, where subclasses are employed, the impracticality
requirement must be satisfied as to each sub-class. E.g., Roby v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 775 F.2d
959 (8th Cir. 1985).
20. Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, I Newberg on Class Actions § 3.03, at 3-10-1i (3d ed.
1992).
21. Id.; see Harriss v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1977); see
also Republic Nat. Bank v. Denton & Anderson Co., 68 F.R.D. 208 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
22. E.g., Mathis v. Bess, 138 F.R.D. 390, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild &
Co., 726 F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n,
97 F.R.D. 668. 676-77 (N.D. i11. 1983); cf Ashe v. Board of Elections, 124 F.R.D. 45, 52 (E.D.N.Y.
1989).
23. See, e.g., Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1993); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113, 101 S. Ct. 923 (1981); see also Jordan v. County of
Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir.), vac'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810, 103 S. Ct. 35 (1982);
Larry James Oldsmobile-Pontiac-GMC Truck Co. v. General Motors Corp., 164 F.R.D. 428 (N.D.
Miss. 1996); cf Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 935 ("impractical" should not be equated with "impossibili-
ty"); Bradley v. Harrelson, 151 F.R.D. 422 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
24. E.g., Robidoux, 987 F.2d 931.
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members, the mere existence of such potential future claimants may be enough
to satisfy the numerosity requirement."
b. Commonality
Perhaps the most fundamental inquiry under Rule 23(a)(2), the commonality
requirement simply asks whether a single wrong or series of related wrongs are
common to the members of the proposed class. It is generally recognized that
Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement does not require an absolute identity of
factual or legal issues among prospective class members; rather, there need only
be a predominance of such common issues." Nonetheless, the jurisprudence
is by no means consistent." Indeed, a dispute exists as to whether more than
one common question-no matter how critical or fundamental that issue may
be-is necessary.2"
As will be seen later, the commonality analysis required under Rule 23(a)(2)
is intimately linked with the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3). 9
Indeed, even the Supreme Court has noted that the commonality and typicality
requirements "tend to merge." 3 Nonetheless, the 23(a)(2) requirement does'
retain significance as a threshold inquiry before courts address the predominance
prong under Rule 23(b)(3). 3' On the other hand, under 23(b)(2), which allows
for certification of certain classes without any predominance inquiry, the class
need only satisfy the commonality inquiry under 23(a)(2). 2
Perhaps the most obvious example of a case where commonality is present
is a suit where the party opposing the class has engaged in a course of conduct
that has given rise to a legally cognizable injury to a group of persons, such as
25. Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 673 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1038, 103 S. Ct. 1428 (1983); Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
26. E.g., Johnson v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978); D'Alauro v. GC
Servs. Ltd. Partnership, 168 F.R.D. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems..
Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 573 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Although the threshold for commonality is not high, class
certification requires at least two issues in common.... If the plaintiffs cannot identify more than
one common issue, they cannot argue that the common issues predominate this litigation.").
27. Compare In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 974 (5th Cir. 1996) (interest in minimizing
attorneys' fees supported finding of commonality) with Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d
610. 626-27 (3d Cir. 1996) (existence of different types of injuries allegedly caused by asbestos
exposure weighs against finding of commonality). aff'd sub nor. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor.
117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
28. Compare Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982) with Trief v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 144 F.R.D. 193, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 98-108.
30. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2371 n.13 (1982).
Cf. In re The Appliance Store, Inc., 158 B.R. 384 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (suggesting that
"commonality inquiry" is intertwined with typicality, adequacy, and standing requirements).
31. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 146 F.R.D. I. 3 (D.D.C. 1992); Heastic v.
Community Bank. 125 F.R.D. 669, 674 (N.D. III. 1989).
32. Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 675-76 (10th Cir. 1988).
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a consumer anti-trust suit or a RICO action.33 Similarly, commonality will
often be present where a group of individuals seek to challenge a property right,
such as a challenge by licensees to a common underlying patent or copyright.
3 4
c. Typicality
Typicality, the third prerequisite for certification of a class action identified
under Rule 23(a), requires commonality between the legal claims of the named
class representatives and the unnamed class members.3 5 As explained by one
commentator:
Typicality determines whether a sufficient relationship exists between
the injury to the named plaintiff and the conduct affecting the class, so
that the court may properly attribute a collective nature to the chal-
lenged conduct. In other words, when such a relationship is shown, a
plaintiff's injury arises from or is directly related to a wrong to a class,
and that wrong includes the wrong to the plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff's
claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of
conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his
or her claims are based on the same legal theory. When it is alleged
that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the
named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality
requirement is usually met irrespective of varying fact patterns which
underlie individual claims.36
In other words, the purported representative "must be part of the class and
possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members."3
Generally speaking, a plaintiff's claim is "typical" if it arises from the same
event or conduct that gave rise to the claims of the other class members and is
based on the same legal theory.3" Additionally, the class representative must
33. E.g., Buford v. H & R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340 (S.D. Ga. 1996); In re Catfish Antitrust
Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1993); cf. Hoban v. USLIFE Credit Life Ins. Co., 163 F.R.D.
509 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (commonality predicated upon use of form contract).
34. E.g., Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971).
35. Federal courts have long struggled with both the meaning and the purpose of this
requirement, with some courts strongly questioning its usefulness. See, e.g., Sanders v. Robinson
Humphrey/American Express, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd in part sub
nom Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718 (11 th Cir. 1987). Not surprisingly, many
courts have concluded that typicality is subsumed within the commonality and adequacy of
representation prongs of Rule 23(a). E.g., Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 606
(N.D. Cal. 1991); see also, Duggan v. Bowen, 691 F. Supp. 1487, 1500-04 (D.D.C. 1988).
36. 1 Newberg, supra note 20, § 3.13, at 3-76-77.
37. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2370 (1982).
38. See Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1051,
113S. Ct. 972 (1993).
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demonstrate an actual injury39 of the same type as other class members' (though
not necessarily of the same severity, nor necessarily having been suffered at the
same time)40 that both is of sufficient severity properly to motivate the
representative vigorously to pursue the entire suit" (as in a conspiracy case)4
and is not subject to any unique defenses."3 If the representative brings a
different claim,4 or is subject to unique defenses (as where a putative class
representative in a consumer fraud case defaulted on a loan), this inconsistency
may disqualify her. 5 The facts and claims applicable to the representative to
the class do not, however, have to be identical."In consumer fraud cases, where the plaintiff often must prove some degree
of actual reliance on the defendant's unlawful conduct absent a presumption of
reliance (as applies under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine developed under Rule
10b-5), this patently individual question may of itself frustrate a finding of
typicality."7 Similar complications often obtain in mass-tort cases.
d. Adequacy
Class representatives, as well as their counsel, must adequately represent
the class. 9 What constitutes adequate representation is a question of fact
that depends on the circumstances of each case.50 It is the plaintiff's
39. See, e.g.,'O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488; 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974).
40. See Sanna v. Delta Airlines, 132 F.R.D. 47 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Wucsina v. Reliance Elec.
Co., 129 F.R.D. 164 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
41. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
42. La Mar v. H&B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1973).
43. Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 990 (11th Cir. 1988)..
44. The mere fact that a putative class representative has claims those of the class of itself would
normally defeat typicality. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
45. See, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903
F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025, 111 S. Ct. 675 (1991); Hoexter v. Simmons,
140 F.R.D. 416 (D. Ariz. 1991); see also, Graham v. Security Say. & Loan, 125 F.R.D. 687, 691
n.4 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Veal v. First Am. Says. Bank, 914 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1990).
46. See, e.g., Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F.2d 955, 958 (11 th Cir. 1985); Milonas v. Williams,
691 F.2d 931,938 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069, 103 S. Ct. 1524 (1983); Leyva v.
Buley, 125 F.R.D. 512, 515 (E.D. Wash. 1989).
47. Cf Maguire v. Sandy Mac, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 444, 451 (D.N.J. 1991), vaed on other
grounds, 145 F.R.D. 50 (D.N.J. 1992); but see Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1051, 113 S. CL 972 (1993).
48. See, e.g., Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258, 262-63 (S.D. Cal. 1988); but
see In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 747 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Anderson v. Aetna
Cas. & Surety Co., 493 U.S. 959, 110 S. Ct. 377 (1989).
49. See Newberg, supra note 20, § 3.21, at 3-125.
50. See Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 482 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Diduck v. Kaszycki
& Sons Contractors, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). It should be noted that there is a
significant body of case law merging analysis under the adequacy and typicality prongs of Rule
23(a). See I Newberg, supra note 20, at § 3.22; see also Wynn v. Dixieland Food Stores, Inc., 125
F.R.D. 696, 700 (M.D. Ala. 1989); Bartleson v. Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D..657 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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burden to establish the adequacy of her prospective representation of the
class."'
Adequate representation is the foundation which renders class actions
consistent with Due Process, and the trial court has a continuing duty to
scrutinize the adequacy of the representation by the alleged representative and her
counsel." Few conflicts are tolerated, because if absent class members are not
adequately represented, any final judgment will have no resjudicata effect as to
them."
Certainly, class representatives must understand and accept responsibility for
prosecuting the claims of the class." ' Contrary to a common misconception, to
be an adequate representative, a named plaintiff does not necessarily have to be
able to finance notice (indeed, class counsel often funds this and related
"litigation costs")."5 Nor does the proposed representative need to understand
the technical aspects of the case; class representatives need only have a general
understanding of the nature of the claims alleged on behalf of the class.56
Antagonism or conflict between class members may frustrate the adequacy
of representation."5 Thus, for example, class representatives must seek the same
relief sought for the class as a whole (a line of inquiry which, of course, returns
analysis to the typicality prong discussed above)."s
Some courts have also examined the "credibility" of the class representative,
an analysis that in practice focuses upon the character of the proposed representa-
tive, as well as concerns akin to those implicated under Rule 23(a)(3). 9 For
lack of credibility alone to defeat certification, however, the deficiency must be
51. E.g., Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 604 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974).
52. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Oswald v. General Motors Corp., 444 U.S. 870, 100 S. Ct. 146 (1979); see also
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42, 61 S. Ct. 1]5. 118 (1940); Walker v. Luther, 644 F. Supp. 76,
79 (D. Conn. 1986), affd, 830 F. 2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1987).
53. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808-09, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2972-73 (1985)
(citing Hansberry, 311 U.S. 32); Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1994).
54. Newberg, supra note 20, § 3.26; Rivera v. Fair Chevrolet Geo Parlnership, 165 F.R.D. 361
(D. Conn. 1996).
55. See Seidman v. American Mobile Sys., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Harris v.
General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1989); but see Jackson v. Rltpps, 132 F.R.D. 226
(W.D. Mo. 1990); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987); cf Roper v.
Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978) (resources of putative class representative may be
relevant), ard on other grounds sub nom. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100
S. Ct. 1166 (1980); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(e) (1983).
56. E.g., Welling v. Alexy, 155 F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
57. See Newberg, supra note 20, § 3.23, at 3-130 to 3-131; see also Horton v. Goose Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207, 103 S. Ct. 3536
(1983); Gill v. Monroe County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 95 F.R.D. 518, 520 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
58. TBK Partners v. Chomeau, 104 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
59. Newberg, supra note 20, § 3.36; see e.g., Hall v. Burger King Corp., No. 89-0260-CIV-
KEHOE, 1992 WL 372354, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 1992); Kaplan v. Pomerantz, 132 F.R.D. 504,
510 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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almost blatantly obvious." Related concerns arise in situations where there is
reason to believe that the representative will pursue personal interests at the
expense of the class.6 ' Similarly, certification may be inappropriate where there
is conflict or antagonism between class members and class representatives.
6 2
In that regard, the Fifth Circuit has held that the mere existence of such a
conflict at the outset of the suit warrants denial of certification absent a ready
cure, such as the exclusion of antagonistic class members or the creation of
subclasses.63
In the federal jurisprudence, adequacy of representation also requires the
court to consider the adequacy of the class attorneys who, as the guardian of the
class, have a fiduciary duty toward each class member.6 Thus, attorneys for
the class must be committed to serving the class as fiduciaries, avoiding any
conflicts with class members (including absent members) and vigorously
litigating all aspects of the case.65. Because class counsel is considered a
guardian of the class and has a fiduciary duty to each member of the class, class
counsel is held to a very high standard of care."6 Class counsel may be
scrutinized as to their professional credentials, experience, resources, actual
performance, ethical records, potential or actual conflicts, and the like. In the
present litigation environment, one interesting application of this element of the
adequacy of representation inquiry is the potential for challenges to class counsel
who represent another class in a separate suit (or suits) against the same
defendant, since both classes are potentially competing for the same funds or
assets.
67
Courts have the power to "cure" deficient representation, but where there is
an actual, serious conflict among class members or there is a significant diversity
of class interests, or in other situations of significant conflicts or divergenc-
es-particularly in cases concerning defendant classes-de-certification may be
the only available alternative. 8
60. See, e.g., Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463,465-66 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1080, 109 S. Ct. 2099 (1989).
61. See, e.g., TBK Partners, 104 F.R.D. at 131.
62. See. e.g.. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393.403, 95 S. Ct. 553. 559 (1975); Payne v. Travenol
Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 810 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038, 103 S. Ct. 451 (1982).
63. Payne, 673 F.2d at 812.
64. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986).
65. 1 Newberg, supra note 20, § 3.24.
66. See Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112,1144 (1lth Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169,
106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 679 (ND. Ohio 1995); see also
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 179 (2d Cir. 1987).
67. Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 258 (N.D. Cal. 1978); but cf Harris v.
General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
68. Payne v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038,
103 S. Ct. 451 (1982).
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2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)
Rule 23(b) provides three alternate "grounds" for certification, assuming the
existence of a proper class and class representative consistent with the require-
ments of 23(a). Subsection (b)(1) addresses situations where the defendant or
absent class members would be prejudiced without a single, unitary decision;
Subsection (b)(2) addresses cases where an injunction is sought to restrain or
enforce conduct by a defendant on grounds uniformly applicable to all class
members; and Subsection 23(b)(3) broadly allows for class actions in any other
situations where the procedure is shown to be superior to alternative procedural
options and it is demonstrated that common issues predominate over individual
ones. Given the direct incorporation of Section (a) of Rule 23 into each
subsection of 23(b), it is not surprising that there is considerable overlap between
these categories. Clearly, Subsection (b)(3) is the broadest, almost acting as a
catch-all; indeed, it has been suggested (with some persuasiveness) that 23(b)(3)
states the general rule, while Sections (b)(l) and (b)(2) simply represent specific
examples of particularly appropriate types of class action.69
a. Rule 23(b)(1)
Rule 23(b)(1) actions (commonly referred to as "prejudice actions") 0 are
proper in cases where the rights of individual class members would be prejudiced
if the suit were brought individually or in cases in which inconsistent adjudica-
tion among the parties might result if the suit were pursued individually, rather
than by the appropriate class.7'
The rule is divided into two sections, concerned with the interests of
potential defendants and potential absent class members respectively. A Rule
23(b)(l)(A) class action exists for the benefit of potential defendants where there
is a serious risk of irreconcilable results if separate actions were to be pur-
sued.7" There must, however, be a real risk that separate actions will occur;
there is no danger of courts fashioning different, incompatible standards without
the risk of separate actions." Consistent with Rule 23's heritage, this type of
class action can fairly be viewed as analogous to interpleader, bringing claimants
together to litigate in one action their conflicting claims against a common
defendant.74
69. See Adolf Hamburg, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609,
653-54 (1971).
70. See Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1986).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Winder Licensing, Inc. v. King Instrument Corp., 130 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. Ill.
1990); CBS, Inc. v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794, 802 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
73. First Fed. Bank v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989); see Berlin Democratic Club
v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976).
74. See, e.g.. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1980),
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Generally, if the threatened inconsistency is the possibility of inconsistent
liability judgments, as where the defendant is required to pay money damages to
one plaintiff but not to another, or where there is some lingering risk of
subsequent adverse judgments, the purpose underlying Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is not
met." For example, Rule 23(b)(1)(A) certification is not appropriate when the
threatened inconsistency is that the defendant might be ordered to pay damages
in one lawsuit but not another. Thus, federal courts commonly state that Rule
23(b)(1)(A) classes are only appropriate where the defendant will truly be in a
"conflicted position," wherein different results that would directly impair the
defendant's ability to pursue a uniform course of conduct are likely.7" The
classic example of a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action is a suit by a group of patent
licensees challenging the underlying patent. Other examples might include a suit
by shareholders to compel a dividend or recognize preemptive rights, or an action
by an indenture trustee to protect the holders of securities."
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) protects the absent potential class members from a situation
where the one action that could effectively dispose of their rights or interests
proceeds without them.7" The best example of a 23(b)(1)(B) class action is a
suit over disposition of a common, limited fund; for instance, the dissolution of
a corporation or partnership. 9 When such a proceeding is allowed to go
forward, "[a]ll those who come within the description in the certificationbecome,
and must remain, members of the class because no opt-out provision exists.""0
Movants must, accordingly, demonstrate that there is a finite source of funds for
satisfying the alleged liability that exceeds the value of the fund, which in turn
requires proof with respect to the total available assets and the likely aggregate
value of all potential claims.8
As noted, courts usually hold that suits for damages do not qualify for Rule
23(b)(1) certification, since such actions generally do not give rise to a risk of
inconsistent results that establish incompatible standards of future conduct or
raise the concern of impairing class members' rights to protect their interests.8 2
mod'd, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied, 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied sub
nom. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984); cf. CBS, Inc.,
681 F. Supp. at 802.
75. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 465-67 (9th Cir. 1973).
76. E.g., United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10, 17 (D. Nev. 1975).
77. See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 100.
78. D'Arrigo Bros. Co. v. Freshville Produce Disbibs., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 1091, 1990 WL
310632 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1990).
79. See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966); see also Specialty Cabinets &
Fixtures, Inc. v. American Equitable Life Ins. Co., 140 F.R.D. 474, 477 (S.D. Ga. 1991).
80. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996,1002 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 915,
107 S. Ct. 182, 318 (1986).
81. Id.; see also In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 825 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991), vac'd, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), mod'd, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
82. See, e.g., In re Dennis Greeman Secs. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11 th Cir. 1987); In re
Bendictin Prods. Liability Litigaigion, 749 F.2d 300, 305 (6th Cir. 1984); Bear v. Oglebay, 142
F.R.D. 129, 132 (N.D. W.Va. 1992).
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Thus, certification of a Rule 23(b)(1) class action generally occurs in cases
seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief, although certification is not
expressly limited to such cases, and 23(b)(1) theoretically may also be relied
upon in certain types of damage actions, such as cases where class demands
exceed the resources of the defendant. 3 The risk of prejudice must be
inevitable and not just possible in such cases, however. Thus, for example,
certification is not warranted under 23(b)(1)(B) where victims of a mass tort
complain that a defendant has limited funds, rendering it inprobable that all
victims may recover or recover the full amount, since there is no certainty that
the defendant's assets will be exhausted in the course of defending against and
satisfying potential individual claims. 4
b. Rule 23(b)(2)
A Rule 23(b)(2) class action is available when "[t]he party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole." Thus, a Rule 23(b)(2) class action
ordinarily is appropriate for claimants seeking injunctive or declaratoryjudgment
relief. In addition, however, the class proponent must show that the other party
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. This type
of class was designed primarily to handle constitutional and civil rights cases and
is often referred to as the "civil rights" class action rule. 5 It also has been used
to prosecute environmental claims and for the resolution of far-reaching patent
claims.
86
The text of Rule 23(b)(2) imposes two prerequisites to certification. First,
the challenged conduct must be "generally applicable to the class," which means
that the defendant's actions must affect all persons fitting within the defined
putative class.8 7 This does not, however, mean that the defendant must have
acted directly against each member of the class.88 Second, the suit must seek
injunctive or declaratory relief.8 9 Rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in
83. See. e.g., Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96, 162 at 90, 898-99 (N.D. Cal., June 14, 1991).
84. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S. Ct. 1506 (1976).
85. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2371 n.15 (1982);
see Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966); Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d
1144, 1152 (11th Cir. 1983).
86. Newberg, supra note 20, § 4.11 nn. 123-27.
87. E.g., Smiths v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 501 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 6, 1974).
88.. Wilcox v. Petit, 117 F.R.D. 314, 318 (D. Me. 1987).
89. See Angelo N. Ancheta, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33
UCLA L. Rev. 283, 314-15 (1985).
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which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money
damages."9
Because of the notice costs and additional certificationrequirements imposed
upon the class representative under Rule 23(b)(3) classes, class representatives
and their counsel sometimes attempt to invoke Rule 23(b)(2) improperly by
including in their requested relief a demand for an injunction or declaratory
judgment. Federal cases have held that a suit that predominantly seeks monetary
damages does not qualify under Rule 23(b)(2). 9 In Indiana State Employees
Association, Inc. v. Indiana State Highway Commission,92 state employees
sought reimbursement of forced political contributions and declaratory and
injunctive relief. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their class
qualified under Rule 23(b)(2), stating that the individualized nature of the
damage claims was such that the damage issues in the case would predominate
or overwhelm issues of generalized, equitable relief.93
c. Rule 23(b)(3)
Ever since Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,94 which required class representa-
tives to bear the cost of notice in 23(b)(3) actions, litigants have made a
determined effort to fit their suits within 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), which do not
have opt-out provisions and, hence, do not require the same notice necessary
under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires members be allowed to opt out. Nonethe-
less, because it is in effect a catch-all category, 23(b)(3) remains the most
common ground for pursuing class actions.
A Rule 23(b)(3) class action may be certified when "the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." 95 The essential issue under Rule 23(b)(3) is balancing judicial
economy against procedural fairness to individual persons whose interests are
implicated in the putative class action: the class representative must "assure the
[c]ourt that use of the class action device will achieve the economies of time,
effort and expense contemplated by the Rule, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." 96
90. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
91. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sees., 113 F.R.D. 579 (D.N.J. 1986). But cf Newberg,
supra note 20. § 4.14.
92. 78 F.R.D. 724, 726 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
93. Id. at 725-26; see also Nelsen v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1990); cf.
Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170,
106 S. Ct. 2891 (1986); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971).
94. 417 U.S. 156, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
95. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Comell L. Rev.
779, 789 (1985).
96. Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 92 F.R.D. 32,41 (E.D. Va. 1981). This phrasing is almost
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As written, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that two subcomponents be met in order
to properly certify'a class thereunder. The court must find that: (1) common
questions among the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members; and (2) that a class action is the superior method of
adjudicating the matter.97
D. Common Questions Predominate
The concept of judicial efficiency is at the heart of the predominance
inquiry." As Professor Newberg explains, this test is not meant to require that
"common issues ... be dispositive of the controversy, or even be determinative
of the liability issues involved"; or to require a comparison of the court time of
disposing of the common questions versus the court time involved in disposing
of individual issues; or to give rise to a "numerical test" between the number of
individual issues and the number of common questions." He states:
A single common issue may be the overriding one in the litigation,
despite the fact that the suit also entails numerous remaining individual
questions.... In finding that common questions do predominate over
individual ones in particular cases, courts have pointed to such issues
that possess the common nucleus of fact for all related questions, have
spoken of a common issue as the central, or overriding question, or
have used similar articulations. 00
In determining whether common issues predominate, courts generally engage
in a three-stage analysis: (1) first, the court must identify the substantive
elements of the cause of action; (2) the proof necessary to meet the plaintiff's
burden of proof as to those elements must be considered; and (3) the alternative
procedural mechanisms for adjudicating the case must be evaluated in terms of
promoting judicial economy.' The mere fact that each class member seeks
separate damages, or even that each claim arose out of a separate transaction with
the defendant, are not necessarily dispositive-the question is whether common
issues of law and fact present in each class member's claim "predominate."'0 2
indistinguishable from the "common character" inquiry developed in Louisiana case law construing
the state's prior class action rules.
97. See Trangsrud, supra note 95, at 789.
98. See Elkins v. Equitable Life Ins. of Iowa, No. 96-296, 1998 WL 133741 (M.D. Fla., Jan.
27, 1998).
99. I Newberg, supra note 20, § 4.25, at 4-82 to 4-84.
100. Id. at 4-84 to 4-86.
101. See Expanding Energy, Inc. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 180 (S.D. Tex. 1990); see
also, Anderson v. Bank of the South, N.A., 118 F.R.D. 136, 150 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Goldwater v.
Alston & Bird, 116 F.R.D. 342, 354 (S.D. Ill. 1987).
102. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816, 97 S.
Ct. 57 (1976); see also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Bresson v.
Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 339, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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By way of example, although it is possible to certify fraudulent
misrepresentation cases, certification ordinarily is not appropriate. To begin
with, the same or a substantively indistinguishable misrepresentation must
have been made to all class members, as where the misrepresentation
appears in a standardized document or public filing or similarly common
disclosure.0 3  Second, in such cases reliance ordinarily must be estab-
lished, which usually requires proof as to the state of mind of each
claimant, a practicality of proof that normally will frustrate certification
because of its inherent individuality.'0" Proof of causation may also
engender significant individual issues.'05 Also, questions of individual
injury may preclude certification, particularly where the court fears those
questions may "overwhelm" the litigation as a whole."0 6
In many cases, the question of individual damages takes center stage.
As Professor Newberg has observed: "In most cases, the amount of
damages suffered is an individual matter, but the Advisory Committee
Notes expressly state that ... individual proof of damages will not
preclude a finding of predominance."'0 7  Thus, the mere presence of
individual damage issues should not automatically preclude certification
under the prong of Rule 23.'0'
E. Class Action is Superior Method of Adjudicating the Matter
In addition to finding that common questions predominate over individual
ones, Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that a class action be the "superior" method for
litigating the case. The court in Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co."9 explained
this requirement as follows:
Even if the other prerequisites could be shown, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that a class action is the best means of resolving the
controversy. The Rule does not say that the class vehicle must be "as
103. See Crasto v. Estate of Kaskel, 63 F.R.D. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
104. E.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 673-74(7thCir. 1981),cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917,102
S. Ct. 1774 (1982); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cit.
1973); Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 225 (E.D. Pa. 1991); cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 247, 108 S. Ct. 978, 991 (1988) (presuming reliance in Rule lOb-5 cases under the
"fraud on the market" theory); see also Grainger v. State Sec. Life Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 303, 307-08
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Nimmo v. Grainger, 436 U.S. 932, 98 S. Ct. 2832 (1978).
105. See Strain v. Nutri/System, Inc., No. Civ.A. 90-2772, 1990 WL 209325, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 12, 1990); see also Torres v. CareerCom. Corp., No. 91-3587, 1992 WL 245923, at 03 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 18, 1992).
106. Elliot, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340 at 049-50; see also, Parnes v. Mast Prop. Investors.
Inc., 776 F. Supp. 792, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
107. 1 Newberg, supra note 20, § 4.26, at 4.90 to 4-91.
108. But see Elliot, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at 049-50; Pames v. Mast Prop. Invs., Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 792, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
109. 68 F.R.D. 443, 454 (M.D. Ga. 1975); see also Elkins, 1998 WL 133741 at "14-16.
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good as" or "almost as good as" some other available method. The
word chosen was "superior." Thus, if, as here, the maintenance of a
case as a class action presents problems not present in some other
procedural alternative, it clearly is not superior to all other methods.
(footnotes omitted).
Rule 23(b)(3) specifies four non-exclusive factors which may be considered
under the superiority inquiry: (1) the interest of individual control by class
members; (2) the existence of other litigation; (3) the effect of concentrating the
litigation in the particular forum; and (4) the likely difficulties in managing the
action.
First, then, the court must consider the interest of the class members in
maintaining an individual action, which could be a serious concern in cases
where class members have suffered catastrophic injuries."' Next, the court
should look at pending litigation addressing the same or related issues by or
against some or all of the putative class' members, considering the feasibility of
staying or consolidating those competing suits.
Third, the court should look at the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in that particular forum considering
party and witness convenience, accessibility of tangible evidence, the interests of
the forum state, and the like.
Finally, the court must consider the manageability of the proposed class
action, keeping in mind such factors as the size of the proposed class, the number
(and complexity) of individual versus class issues, the likelihood of personal
interventions by other class members, the potential for counter-claims, cross-
claims, and the like, the receptiveness of class members to certification, and
whether the costs of obtaining and distributing any likely recovery can be
expected to render de minimis the benefit to individual class members."'
Inquiry under all of these factors is driven by concern with the relative
desirability of alternative procedural devices, including requiring the prosecution
of individual suits that are to be consolidated for trial of common issues." 2
F. The Immature Tort: Castano
Construing Rule 23(b)(3), the Fifth Circuit recently overturned certification
of a nationwide tobacco exposure class action described by the court as "the
largest class action ever attempted in federal court.. . ."" In Castano, the
class complaint alleged that several tobacco companies failed to inform
consumers that nicotine is addictive and manipulated the level of nicotine in
110. Abed v. A. H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
IlI. E.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
112. See, e.g., Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123, 1133 (D.N.J. 1989);
Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 636 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
113. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
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cigarettes to enhance their addictive properties."' The putative class included
"nicotine-dependent" persons throughout the United States, together with their
heirs, relatives, and "significant others." After finding that the putative class and
class representatives met the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, as well as the predomi-
nance and superiority requirements of Section (b)(3), the district court condition-
ally certified the class with respect to several "core liability" issues.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Fifth Circuit
anchored its opinion with the observation that class actions are not generally
appropriate for mass torts."' According to the court, certification of a class
in such cases "dramatically affects the stakes for defendants, . . . magnifies and
strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims,... makes it more likely [that
defendants will be found liable, and] creates insurmountable pressure on
defendants to settle.""'  The Fifth Circuit even went so far as to characterize
the seemingly inevitable progression of such cases towards settlement as a type
of "judicial blackmail." ' 7
The Fifth Circuit did not, however, ultimately base its decision on the
appropriateness of mass tort class actions. Instead, the court focused upon the
propriety of using the class action to test so-called "novel" torts,"' concluding
that, because "no court in the country had ever tried an addiction-as-injury
claim," the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) could
not be met."9 Embedded within the court's novelty discussion was concern
with the "maturity" of the underlying cause of action: the Fifth Circuit plainly
felt that without an "established track record of trials" adjudicating a novel
theory for recovery, a proper predominance and superiority analysis under Rule
23(b)(3) was impossible."' 0 Moreover, even with such a "track record," the
Fifth Circuit suggested that the superiority requirement also required proof of
enough individual lawsuits advancing the theory that a "judicial management
crisis" appeared imminent. 12
114. Id.
115. Id. at 746.
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Id.
118. See id. at 748.
119. Id. at 744-45.
120. Id. at 747. For example, without established jurisprudence, it would be difficult for a court
even to identify the issues of the novel cause of action, let alone determine if common issues
predominate. Id. at 749. Similarly, given the inherent pressures and prejudices endemic to class
actions, particularly those alleging mass torts, it is very difficult to argue that the class action is the
superior mechanism by which to test and "mature" novel theories of recovery. "The collective
wisdom of individual juries is necessary before this court commits the fate of an entire industry or,
indeed, the fate of a class of millions, to a single jury." Significantly, the proposed amendments to
Rule 23 would include a maturity inquiry under 23(B)(3). 167 F.R.D. 559, 559 (1996).
121. Id. at 747-48; see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.) (Posner,
J.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
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II. THE LOUISIANA ARTICLES
A. Introduction
The relevant Articles of the Code of Civil Procedure were dramatically
altered by Louisiana Act 1997 No. 839, section 1, which adopted wholesale the
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 with a few additions. Pursuant
to Section 3 of Act 839, however, this new regime is applicable "only to actions
filed on and after its effective date," which was July 10, 1997. Thus, class
actions filed before July 10, 1997 will be governed by the prior rules. It remains
to be seen how the courts will treat federal cases filed before July 10, 1997 that
are later remanded to state court, an inquiry which may vary depending upon
whether the case was originally filed in federal court or, instead, was removed
from state court.' 2
2
B. The Amended Articles
As now amended, the relevant Code article governing the certification of
class actions, Louisiana Code Civil Procedure article 591, provides as follows:
A. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representa-
tive parties on behalf of all, only if:
(I) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.
(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class.
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.
(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
(5) The class is or may be defined objectively in terms of
ascertainable criteria, such that the court may determine the
constituency of the class for purposes of the conclusiveness of
any judgment that may be rendered in the case.
B. An action may be maintained as a class action only if all of the
prerequisites of Paragraph A of this Article are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individu-
al members of the class would create a risk of: (a) Inconsistent
or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or (b) Adjudications
122. See Arnentor v. General Motors Corp., 399 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); cf.
deReyes v. Marine Mgt. & Consulting, Ltd., 544 So. 2d 1259 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 548
So. 2d 1249 (1989).
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with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to these
findings include: (a) The interest of the members of the class
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (b) The extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (c) The desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation in the paiticular forum; (d) The
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action; (e) The practical ability of individual class
members to pursue their claims without class certification; (f)
The extent to which the relief plausibly demanded on behalf of
or against the class, including the vindication of such public
policies or legal rights as may be implicated, justifies the costs
and burdens of class litigation; or
(4) The parties to a settlement request certification under
Subparagraph B(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the
requirements of Subparagraph B(3) might not otherwise be
met.
C. Certification shall not be for the purpose of adjudicating claims or
defenses dependent for their resolution on proof individual to a member
of the class. However, following certification, the court shall retain
jurisdiction over claims or defenses dependent for their resolution on
proof individual to a member of the class.
Act No. 839, section 1 (1997).
Also of note is new-Article 592, which provides a new procedure for
obtaining certification of class actions:
A. (I) Within ninety days after service on all adverse parties of the
initial pleading demanding relief on behalf of or against a class, the
proponent of the class shall file a motion to certify the action as a
class action. The delay for filing the motion may be extended by
stipulation of the parties or on motion for good cause shown.
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(2) If the proponent fails to file a motion for certification
within the delay allowed by Subparagraph A(I), any adverse
party may file a notice of the failure to move for certification.
On the filing of such a notice and after hearing thereon, the
demand for class relief may be stricken. If the demand for
class relief is stricken, the action may continue between the
named parties alone. A demand for class relief stricken under
this Subparagraph may be reinstated upon a showing of good
cause by the proponent.
(3)(a) No motion to certify an action as a class action shall be
granted prior to a hearing on the motion. Such hearing shall
be held as soon as practicable, but in no event before (i) all
named adverse parties have been served with the pleading
containing the demand for class relief or have made an
appearance or, with respect to unserved defendants who have
not appeared, the proponent of the class has made due and
diligent effort to perfect service of such pleading; and (ii) the
parties have had a reasonable opportunity to obtain discovery
on class certification issues, on such terms and conditions as
the court deems necessary. (b) If the court finds that the action
should be maintained as a class action, it shall certify the
action accordingly. If the court finds that the action should not
be maintained as a class action, the action may continue
between the named parties. (c) In the process of class certifi-
cation, or at any time thereafter before a decision on the merits
of the common issues, the court may alter, amend, or recall its
initial ruling on certification and may enlarge, restrict, or
otherwise redefine the constituency of the class or the issues to
be maintained in the class action. (d) No order contemplated
in this Subparagraph shall be rendered after a judgment or
partial judgment on the merits of common issues has been
rendered against the party opposing the class and over such
party's objection.
B. (1) In any class action maintained under Article 591(B)(3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. This
notice, however given, shall be given as soon as practicable after
certification, but in any event early enough that a delay provided
for the class members to exercise an option to be excluded from the
class will have expired before commencement of the trial on the
merits of the common issues. (2) The notice required by Subpara-
graph B(1) shall include (a) a general description of the action,
including the relief sought, and the names and addresses of the
representative parties or, where appropriate, the identity and
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location of the source from which the names and addresses of the
representative parties can be obtained; (b) a statement of the right
of the person to be excluded from the action by submitting an
election form, including the manner and time for exercising the
election; (c) a statement that the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; (d) a
statement that any member who does not request exclusion may, if
the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel at that
member's expense; (e) a statement advising the class member that
the member may be required to take further action as the court
deems necessary, such as submitting a proof of claim in order to
participate in any recovery had by the class; (f) a general descrip-
tion of any counterclaim brought against the class; (g) the address
of counsel to whom inquiries may be directed; and (h) any other
information that the court deems appropriate. (3) Unless the parties
agree otherwise, the proponents of the class shall bear the expense
of the notification required by this Paragraph. The court may
require the party opposing the class to cooperate in securing the
names and addresses of the persons within the class defined by the
court for the purpose of providing individual notice, but any
additional costs reasonably incurred by the party opposing the class
in complying with this order shall be paid by the proponent of the
class. The court may tax all or part of the expenses incurred for
notification as costs.
C. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Article
591(B)(1) or (B)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Article
591(B)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in Paragraph B
was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the
court finds to be members of the class.
D. When appropriate (1) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (2) a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the
provisions of Article 591 and this Article. shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.
E. In the conduct of actions to which Article 591 and this Article
apply, the court may make any of the following appropriate orders:
(1) Determining the course of proceedings or prescribing
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the
presentation of evidence or argument.
(2) Requiring, for the protection of the members of the class
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be
given in such manner as the court may direct to members of
1998] 1.109
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the class of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of
the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to
intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come
into the action.
(3) Imposing conditions on the representative parties or on
intervenors.
(4) Requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons,
and that the action proceed accordingly.
(5) Dealing with similar procedural matters, including but not
limited to case managementorders providing for consolidation,
duties of counsel, the extent and the scheduling of and the
delays for pre-certification and post- certification discovery,
and other matters which affect the general order of proceed-
ings; however, the court may not order the class-wide trial of
issues dependent for their resolution on proof individual to a
member of the class, including but not limited to the causation
of the member's injuries, the amount of the member's special
or general damages, the individual knowledge or reliance of
the member, or the applicability to the member of individual
claims or defenses.
(6) Any of the orders provided in this Paragraph may be
combined with an order pursuant to Article 1551, and may be
altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
At the time this article was written, the author could locate no reported case
law addressing certification under revised Articles 591 or 592. Obviously, given
the legislature's reliance upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Louisiana
courts can be expected to look to federal case law for guidance in construing
these articles. A few obvious distinctions between Article 591 and Rule 23(a)
and (b) should be noted, however.
I. Identifiability: Article 591(A)(5)
The first difference of note as between Rule 23 and Article 591 is found at
Article 591(A)(5), which has no counterpart in Rule 23. The text of this
subsection, however (which requires that the members of a proposed class must
be objectively identifiable), tracks well-settled federal case law implying such a
provision into Rule 23. In addressing this identifiability requirement, federal
courts have generally concluded that a class is identifiable if, from the
description of the class in the complaint, the court can determine whether a
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particular individual is a member.'2 ' This implied requirement is said to serve
two purposes: (1) it assists both the court and the litigants in ascertaining the
manageability of the proposed class action; and (2) it ensures that the parties
whose rights or interests are at stake will be the recipients of any relief.'24
Furthermore, because the outcome of the putative class action will be res
judicata as to all unnamed members, the definition of the class must not be
vague or difficult to apply; courts therefore commonly require that membership
be "capable of ascertainment under some objective standard."'' Thus, for
example, the class definition cannot depend upon the individual members' state
of mind.'16
2. Practicability and Relief- Article 591(B)(3)(e) & ()
Next, it should be noted that the factors appearing at Subsections (e) and (f)
under Article 591(B)(3) (which is taken from Rule 23(b)(3)) do not appear in the
corresponding text of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23. Again, however,
these criteria track considerations commonly "read into" Rule 23 by the case
law.' Relevant to the inquiry would be questions as to the plausibility of
consolidation, intervention, and joinder.
3. The Settlement Class: Article 591(B)(4)
Similarly, Article 591(B)(4), providing for settlement classes, has no
equivalent provision under Rule 23. Nonetheless, the use of settlement classes
123. Luedke v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 1778, 1993 WL 313577, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
10, 1993); Wright et al.,. supra note 15, § 1760.
124. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S. Ct.
1773 (1982).
125. Crosby v. Social Sec. Admin., 796 F.2d 576, 580 (Ist Cir. 1986) (quoting 3B Moore's
Federal Practice § 23.04[l], at 23-199).
126. Simer, 661 F.2d at 669; DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970).
Compare Harris v. General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (declining to certify
class of persons deterred from seeking employment at defendant corporation because of inevitable
questions as to each member's state of mind) with Rosario v. Cook County, 101 F.R.D. 659, 664
(N.D. 111. 1983) (certifying class of current employees allegedly deterred from seeking promotion).
127. With respect to Article 591(B)(3)(Q, see, e.g., In re Ramtek Sec. Litig., [1990-91 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95, 814, at 98, 908 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 4, 1991); In re Crazy Eddie
Secs. Litig., 135 F.R.D. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d
226, 234 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S. Ct. 1949 (1975) (denying certification
where the size of the potential verdict shocked the court's conscience). With respect to Article
591(B)(3Xe), which to some extent simply re-states the "superiority" inquiry, see. e.g., Dickson v.
Chicago Allied Warehouses, Inc., No. 90 C 6161, 1993 WL 362450, at 02 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1993);
Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D. 480, 482 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Bressen v. Thomson McKinnon Sec.




is commonplace in federal practice.' 3 This practice is not without its critics,
as earlier versions of the manual for complex litigation confirms: "[T]entative
classes for the purpose of settlement ... should never be formed."' 
2 9
In federal practice, the only clear prerequisite for certification of a settlement
class, once requested by the parties, is the existence of an identifiable class.'
30
Interestingly, as written, 591(B)(4) appears to incorporate all of the requirements
under paragraph (A), to-wit: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.
4. Article 591(C): The Function of-Certification
Finally, Paragraph (C) of Article 591 is without precedence under Rule 23
as best as this author can tell. Perhaps it is intended to resolve aspects of the
tolling question addressed in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 3' and
its progeny. In any event, the exact function-and, frankly, meaning-of this
paragraph is unclear, in part because certification is a purely procedural exercise
entirely divorced (at least theoretically) from the substantive merits of a case, 1
and in part because, under paragraphs (A)(I) and (B) of Article 591, certification
is by definition concerned with common issues of law and fact.
C. The Prior Regime in Louisiana
Article 591 (1997) et seq., enacted with the rest of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure in 1960, represented a middle ground, of sorts, between the
original version of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the amended
version adopted in 1966. In piecing Article 591 (1997) et seq. together, the
Code's redactors properly recognized that the "hybrid" and "spurious" class
actions functioned as a sort of joinder mechanism, unnecessary given the Code's
separate joinder provisions and the general jurisdiction of the state's courts:
Under federal practice, Fed. Rule 23 covers three separate and
distinct types of class actions: the true class action, the hybrid class
action, and the spurious class action.
In the true class action, if the representation of the members of the
class is adequate, the judgment concludes not only the representative
parties, but all other members of the class who are not joined as parties.
In strict theory the judgment in the hybrid class action concludes only
128. See. e.g., Gould v. Alleco, Inc.. 883 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058,
110 S. Ct. 870 (1990); in re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 175 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979)
(citing cases), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981).
129. Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.46, at 24 (1973).
130. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1979). But see In re
Dennis Greenman Secs. Litig., 622 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D. Fla. 1985), rev'd, 829 F.2d 1539 (11 th Cir.
1987).
131. 414 U.S. 538, 94 S. Ct. 756 (1974).
132. E.g., Hardin v. Harshbarger, 814 F. Supp. 703, 706 (N.D. III. 1993).
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the representative parties and persons who subsequently join in the
action, but, as a practical matter, since there is a disposition of the
property involved under the judgment, the latter may be prejudicial to
those members of the class who do not join in the action. In the
spurious class action, only the parties who actuallyjoin in the action are
concluded by the judgment, and their rights would not be affected by
their failure to join. "It is an invitation and not a command perfor-
mance." 3 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) 3443 (1948).
Both the hybrid and the spurious class actions are permissive
joinder devices which are badly needed in federal practice where the
jurisdiction of the court often depends upon diversity of citizenship.
Joinder of all members of the class in the original complaint, or by
intervention, would otherwise deprive a federal court of jurisdiction in
all cases where a plaintiff and a defendant are citizens of the same state.
But through the use of this permissive joinder device, the representative
plaintiffs or defendants can be so selected as to afford the necessary
diversity of citizenship; and once the court has acquired jurisdiction
over the class action, it has ancillary jurisdiction to permit the subse-
quent joinder, or to adjudicate the rights of, all other members of the
class. Hence, under its ancillary jurisdiction, the federal court may
render judgment on the claims of those members of the class who
subsequently join in the action.
There is no need for either the hybrid or the spurious class action
in Louisiana, and therefore this Code provides for only the true class
action.'
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 591-592 (1997) were thus taken
almost verbatim from the original Rule 23(a), save for the deletion of paragraphs
23(a)(2) and (3) (addressing hybrid and spurious class actions), and the addition
of a reference to secondary actions (addressed in old Rule 23(b)), which
paragraph was incorporated by the Code's redactors into Article 611 (1997).
Construing this text, Louisiana courts articulated three requirements for
certification of class actions that, at least as subsequently construed in the.
jurisprudence, address the same concerns as do sections (a) and (b) from the
amended text of Rule 23, commonly referred to as the impracticality (or
"numerosity"), adequacy, and "common character" requirements.
1. Impracticality
Under the so-called "impracticality" prong, the jurisprudence requires that
the persons constituting the putative class be "so numerous as to make it
133. See also Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 703 So. 2d 542, 543-44 (La. 1997).
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impracticable for all of them to join or be joined as parties.' 3' This require-
ment reflects the basic function of the class action as a device for allowing a
small number of persons to protect or enforce rights or claims for the benefit of
many where it would be inequitable and impracticable to join every person
sharing an interest in the rights or claims at issue in the suit.' 3" The burden
is on the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that a definable group .of
aggrieved persons exists, and that joinder of all of the class' members would be
impracticable.1 3' By requiring numerosity, the Code, like Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)(1), protects members of very small classes from being denied
their day in court.
Impracticability is not intended as a synonym for "impossibility."' 37
The court must instead examine the facts of each case and reach a fact-
specific conclusion.' 3 In undertaking this analysis, the most obvious
factor for examination is the actual size of the class. In this sense,
although no specific cut-off number exists, the proponent of class action
status must do more than merely allege that a large number of people may
be involved.
3 9
In addition to the actual size of the class, other factors, such as the
difficulty of identifying claimants (for example, situations where prospective
relief, that might directly impact future unknown absent class members, is
being sought) and their geographic dispersion, also are relevant under this
prong of Article 591.0"
134. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(aXI).
135. See, e.g., Lailhengue v. Mobile Oil Co., 657 So. 2d 542 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Verdin
v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1966).
136. Cotton v. Gaylord Container, 691 So. 2d 760, 768 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ.denied, 693 So.
2d 147 (La. 1997); Pulver v. Ist Lake Properties, 681 So. 2d 965, 968 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996);
Brumfield v. Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc., 589 So. 2d 35, 37-38 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
137. See generally Robidoux v. Lelani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993); Cypress v. Newport
News, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
138. Dumas v. Angus Chem. Co., 635 So. 2d 446 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 640 So. 2d
1349 (La. 1994); Adams v. CSX R.I., 615 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
139. See Pulver, 681 So. 2d at 968; Becnel v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 613 So. 2d 1155, 1157
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1993); Dumas, 635 So. 2d at 449 (citing Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 613
So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993)); O'Halleron v. L.E.C., Inc. 471 So. 2d 752, 755 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1985)); cf. Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 613 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1993) (citing Farlough v. Smallwood, 526 So. 2d 810 (La. 1988)).
140. McCastle v. Rollins Envtl. Scrvs., 456 So. 2d 612, 620 (La. 1984) ("Difficulty in
identifying the claimants is one of the factors which makes joinder impracticable and a class action
appropriate."); cf. Williams v. State, 350 So. 2d 131, 133 (La. 1977).
Among those cases where certification was denied under the impracticability standard are the
following: Carr v. Houma Redi-Mix Concrete, Inc., 705 So. 2d 213 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1997);
Phillips v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 541 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Farlough v.
Smallwood, 524 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writdenied, 526 So. 2d 810 (La. 1988); O'Halleron
v. L.E.C., Inc., 471 So. 2d 752 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985); Debs v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 430 So. 2d




Article 592 (1997) also required, in addition to numerosity, that there be as
representatives of the class "[o]ne or more members of [the] class, who will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all members. . . ." Although the
jurisprudence is somewhat confused-a state of affairs that is not surprising
given the meandering language of Article 591 (1997) et seq.-the case law
appears to construe this requirement as a sort of amalgamation of the commonali-
ty, typicality, and representation requirements imposed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a)(2)-(4)."'
Again, there are important due process connotations attendant to the need for
adequate representation. Indeed, even aside from concerns about notice to absent
class members, inadequacy in the representation afforded to class members not
party to a class action suit alone is a sufficient basis to upset any judgment
obtained in the class action suit.
42
A determination of adequacy is inevitably fact intensive, focusing upon the
appropriateness of one or another (often competing) group or faction as the
representative of a class. Most immediately, such an inquiry demands both (1)
that there be an identifiable class, that is, a group of people sharing a claim or
claims that arose from the same event, practice, or course of conduct, based upon
the same legal theory or theories; and (2) that the putative class representative
be a member of that class."' Simply stated, without membership in the class
and an attendant interest in the outcome of litigation concerning that class, it is
assumed that one lacks the motivation vigorously to pursue the rights or claims
shared by the class' members."' Thus, as was noted above, the concept of
141. Cf General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,157 & n.13, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2370 & n.13
(1982) ("[T]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge ... as
guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action
is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that
the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Those
requirements therefore also tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement, although
the latter requirement also raises concerns about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of
interest."); Fertig v. Blue Cross of Iowa, 68 F.R.D. 53, 57 (N.D. Iowa 1974) (the typicality
requirement "apparently overlaps and was intended to buttress the fair representation requirement...
on the theory that if the claims and defenses are typical the representatives in supporting their own
claims will likewise advance the claims of others in like position").
142. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-46, 61 S. Ct. 115. 119-20 (1940); Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind Hansberry v.
Lee, 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 481 (1987).
143. See McCastle, 456 So. 2d at 616; cf Redditt v. Mississippi Extended Care Ctrs., Inc., 718
F.2d 1381, 1387 (5th Cir. 1983); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981); Jones v.
Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975).




"typicality" provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) is
necessarily present under Article 592 (1997) as well. 45
It is the class proponent's burden to demonstrate by affirmative evidence that
the putative class representative will be able to discharge the role of class
representative adequately. 4 ' However, no specific ruling concerning the class
representative is required, as certification presumes adequacy.
47
Louisiana courts considering the question of adequacy have stressed the need
for class membership, often at the expense of any meaningfill analysis. In one
often repeated passage, the adequacy requirement is described as a rule that "the
claims of the class representatives must merely be a cross-section of, or typical
of, the claims of all class members."" Thus, as explained by one court
finding adequate representation, "[wihile each member has not suffered every
type of alleged injury, the representatives' claims are typical of the majority of
the class and their damages represent a cross-section of the typical property,
emotional, and economic injuries suffered by members of the class."'' 49
In one recent case where certification was denied for inadequacy of
representation, the court focused upon the presence of unique factual issues
distinguishing the proposed representatives' claims from those of the class
members as defined in the petition, commenting that even where a common legal
theory has been advanced, if the circumstances giving rise to the representatives'
claim are unique, their representation cannot be adequate: "It is the circumstanc-
es under which class representatives and absent class members came to [be
injured] ... that is the determining factor."'50
Among other factors which may be relevant to such a "typicality" inquiry
are the following:
145. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
146. E.g., Cotton v. Gaylord Container, 691 So. 2d 760, 769 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1997); cf Ellis
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 550 So. 2d 1310, 1315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Dumas, 635 So. 2d at
451; Adams v. CSX R.R., 615 So. 2d 476, 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993); Livingston Parish Police
Jury v. Acadiana Shipyards, Inc., 598 So. 2d 1177, 1181 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
147. E.g., Atkins v. Harcross Chems., Inc., 638 So. 2d 302, 306 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
644 So. 2d 396 (1994).
148. Atkins, 638 So. 2d at 305 (citing Adams v. CSX RR., 615 So. 2d 476, 481 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1993)); see also Lewis v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Co., 698 So. 2d 1001, 1012 (La. App.
I st Cir. 1997) ("If the claims of multiple class representatives are demonstrated to be a cross-section
of the types of claims asserted by the class members, and not antagonistic to the class, the
representatives are adequate."); Dumas, 635 So. 2d at 450.
149. Boudreaux v. State, 690 So. 2d 114, 124 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1997). Cf. Verdin v. Thomas,
191 So. 2d 646, 650-51 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1966) ("It is the unity of interest among members of the
class which is controlling. In determining the question (of adequate representation) the court must
consider (I) whether the interest of the named party is co-extensive with the interests of the other
members of the class; (2) whether his interests are antagonistic in any way to the interest of those
whom he represents; (3) the proportion of those made parties as compared with the total membership
of the class; (4) any other factors bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of
the class.") (citing Moore's Federal Practice).
150. Strong v. Bell South Communications, Inc., 643 So. 2d 319, 322 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
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(1) The representative must be able to demonstrate that he or she
suffered an actual-vis-a-vis hypothetical-injury; 5 '
(2) The representative should possess first hand knowledge or
experience of the conduct at issue in the litigation;52
(3) The representative's stake in the litigation, that is, the
substantiality of his or her interest in winning the lawsuit, should
be significant enough, relative to that of other class -members, to
ensure that representative's conscientious participation in the litiga-
tion;" and
(4) The representative should not have interests seriously antago-
nistic to or in direct conflict with those of other class members, whether
because the representative is subject to unique defenses or additional
claims against him or her, or where the representative is seeking special
or additional relief.1
54
In addition to addressing the class representative, the adequacy of class
counsel has also been considered by at least one court under .this prong of the
certification inquiry:
Additionally, we find that there was no evidence in the record to
support a finding of adequacy of class counsel. To date, our
state courts have not specifically addressed the adequacy of
counsel issue. However, federal courts have long construed the
adequacy of representation requirement to consist of two compo-
nents-adequacy of class representatives as well as the adequacy
of class counsel. 55
151. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974).
152. See, e.g., Sicinski v. Reliance Funding Corp., 82 F.R.D. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); but see,
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 86 S. Ct. 845 (1966).
153. See. e.g., Seidman v. American Mobile Sys., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also
Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (1 th Cir. 1989) (focusing on financial commitment
to litigation and correspondent willingness and ability to represent class vigorously), rev d on other
grounds, 498 U.S. 46, IIi S. Ct. 401. (1990); McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d
554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981) and compare Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1991) and
Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477,479 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Nissan Motor Corp.
v. Sanderson, 421 U.S. 914, 95 S. Ct. 1573 (1975).
154. See, e.g., Compass v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 443 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), writ
denied, 446 So. 2d 1231 (1984); Pellerin v. Louisiana Health Serv. and Indem. Co., 460 So. 2d 93
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); see also Killian v. McCulloch, 873 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd sub
nom. Stadler v. McCulloch, 82 F.3d 406 (3d Cir. 1996); Anderson v. Bank of the South, N.A., 118
F.R.D. 136 (D. Fla. 1987). See generally Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646,650-51 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1966) (quoting 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 3425 (2d ed. 1948)); see also Brown v. New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 506 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 508 So. 2d 67 (1987).





Louisiana courts have evolved the analysis under the third and final prong
of the class action inquiry, the "common character analysis," loosely to track that
of their federal counterparts under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
As explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the analysis is as follows:
Under Louisiana practice there must be a "common character"
among the rights of the representatives and the absent members of the
class in order to make for a proper class action. La. C.C.P. art. 591(1).
This is not merely a reappearance of the common questions threshold
requirement noted above. The requirement of a "common character"
restricts the class action to those cases in which it would achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results. Cf. Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, Rule 23, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-103.
Its object is to identify the cases where a class action promises
important advantages of economy of effort and uniformity of result
without undue dilution of procedural safeguards for members of the
class or for the opposing party. It invites a close look at the case before
it is accepted as a class action and even then requires that it be specially
treated. Cf Kaplan, supra, at 389-390.
When a "common character" of rights exists, a class action is
superior to other available adjudicatory methods for the purpose of
promoting the basic aims and goals of a procedural device: (1)
effectuating substantive law; (2) judicial efficiency; and (3) individual
fairness. Guste v. General Motors Corp., 370 So.2d 477, 488 (La.
1978); Williams v. State, 350 So.2d 131, 133-34 (La. 1977); Stevens v.
Board of Trustees, 309 So.2d 144, 151 (La. 1975). Therefore, if the
superiority of a class action is disputed, the trial court must inquire into
the aspects of the case and decide whether the intertwined goals of
effectuating the substantive law, judicial efficiency, and individual
fairness would be better served by some other procedural device.
Many class action related circumstances in a particular case may
contribute toward or detract from the intertwined goals. Non-exhaustive
lists of some of the factors, which may appear in any given case with
varying degrees of intensity, are set forth by Federal Rule 23(b) and the
Uniform Class Actions Act and have been suggested for use by this
court. See Stevens, supra, 309 So.2d at 150-5 1; Williams, supra, 350
So.2d at 134, n. 3. After identifying the listed factors and any relevant
unlisted ones that may be present in the case, the trial court must
evaluate, quantify and weigh them to determine to what extent the class
action would in each instance promote or detract from the goals of
1118 [Vol. 58
KENT A. LAMBERT
effectuating substantive law, judicial efficiency, and individual fairness.
Upon arriving at an estimate of the class action's overall effectiveness
in furthering the intertwined goals, the court must compare this with its
assessment of the effectiveness of other adjudicatory methods and
decide whether the class action is the superior procedural device.'56
As noted earlier, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b), Section
23(b)(3), which allows for the maintenance of class actions where questions of
law or fact common to the class "predominate" over those relevant only to
isolated members and the class action "is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy," operates as the general or
"catch-all" category of class actions. Under McCastle and its forbears, this
analysis lies at the heart of the Louisiana courts' approach to class action
certification, as well.' 57
The "common character" analysis is therefore properly viewed as a two-step
inquiry, first requiring a determination as to whether common issues predominate
over questions affecting only individual members and second requiring a
determination as to whether the class action mechanism is superior to other
procedural mechanisms. Both inquiries have been described by Louisiana courts
as a "balancing test," designed "to identify the cases where a class action
promises important advantages of economy, effort and uniformity of result," all
subject to considerations of fairness to individual class members. 5 '
156. McCastle v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc., 456 So. 2d 612, 616-18 (La. 1984)
(footnotes omitted). The approach that has evolved in the Louisiana jurisprudence under the so-
called "common character" analysis mirrors in some ways the unified treatment many federal courts
have given to the predominance, commonality, and typicality prongs of Rule 23. See, e.g., Elliot,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340 at § 24 (commonality and predominance are intimately intertwined);
Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 225 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (typicality, dominance, and
superiority elements all overlap); Zupnick v. Thompson Parking Partners, 1990 WL 113197, (1990
Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 95,388 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. I, 1990) (predominance and
superiority analyses always subsume discussions of numerosity, commonality, and typicality); Spicer
v. Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 1990 WL 16983, [1989-90 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,943 at 95,253-54 (N.D. II., Jan. 31, 1990) (finding of predominance assumes
commonality); Meiresonne v. Marriott Corp., 124 F.R.D. 619, 622 n.7 (N.D. III. 1989) (typicality
subsumes commonality); Alexander Grant & Co. v. McAlister, 116 F.R.D. 583, 590-91 (S.D. Ohio
1987) (predominance and superiority inquiries incorporate analyses under numerosity, commonality
and typicality requirements).
If one goes one small step further and accepts, as many federal courts and commentators have, that
Rule 23(b)(3) is the general class action statute and 23(bXl) and (b)(2) class actions are merely
particular examples singled out for special treatment with respect to the opt-out rights of class
members, the results reached in the Louisiana case law under the common character analysis can be
seamlessly merged with federal case law. Failure to be aware of these points, however, can engender
considerable confusion, which in fact infects most of the Louisiana case law addressing the common
character prong under Stevens and its progeny.
157. See Atkins v. Harcross Chems., Inc., 638 So. 2d 302, 304 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
644 So. 2d 396 (1994).
158. Atkins, 638 So. 2d at 304; see also Guste v. General Motors Corp., 307 So. 2d 477, 489
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The Louisiana Supreme Court recently offered the following overview of its
past decisions addressing the common character prong:
Since Stevens, we have applied these factors in three subsequent cases
to determine whether "the character of the right sought to be enforced
.. is common to all members of the class.. ." under La. C.C.P. art..
591. In Williams v. State, we allowed a class action filed by 600
prisoners against the state for food poisoning they suffered after eating
a lunch at a state prison, but held that, for class certification, "[t]he
evidence as to the tort itself must be identical for each claim." 350
So.2d 131, 135 (La. 1977). In State ex rel. Guste v. General Motors
Corp., we allowed a class action by 1,400 car buyers against GMC for
deceptive trade practices, holding that "[tihe mere fact that varying
degrees of damages may result from the same legal relationship does
not defeat a class action." 370 So.2d 477, 489 (La. 1978) (on rehear-
ing). Finally, in McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services of
Louisiana, Inc.,.. ., allowed a class action of 4000 residents against the
operator of a hazardous waste facility and the supplier of the hazardous
waste alleging that the fumes and odors from the facility on certain
dates caused them physical injuries because "there exists as to the
totality of issues a common nucleus of operative facts.. . ." 456 So.2d
612, 620 (La. 1984).
Of particular relevance... is our discussion in McCastle of whether
common questions predominated over individual issues. In McCastle,
we held:
Offering the same facts, all class members will strive to
establish that the hazardous waste materials placed in the soil
by the defendants emitted gases, fumes and odors capable of
causing harm and unreasonable inconvenience to persons in the
neighborhood. Each class member stands in an identical
position with respect to the following issues: (1) whether
hazardous waste materials of the quality and quantity capable
of causing the damage and unreasonable inconvenience alleged
were present at the land farm on the pertinent dates; (2)
whether the land farm emitted harmful and malodorous gases
on the dates alleged; (3) whether the probable dispersion
pattems of the gases and odors emitted include the areas within
which the residences of the members of the class are located.
Id. at 619-620. We further held that the potential individual
issues of whether each member of the class was harmed or
inconvenienced on the same dates or sustained the same
amount of injury did not defeat the class action because "on all
(La. 1979).
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of the dates in question the land farm received similar hazard-
ous waste from the same source and that the land farming
operations were conducted consistently." Id. at 620. "Conse-
quently, there exists as to the totality of issues a common
nucleus of operative facts such as would justify allowing the
class action to proceed." Id. It is important to point out that
in McCastle, the plaintiffs had already been granted an
injunction enjoining the defendant from emitting nauseous
odors, thus indicating the court's belief that the plaintiffs
would likely succeed on the merits. 415 So.2d 515 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1982). Furthermore,... the plaintiffs in McCastle
alleged 129 discrete acts over an 11 -month period that caused
their specific and limited injuries. In addition, in McCastle we
pointed out that there was only one source of odors and
fumes . . .. "
In Guste v. General Motors Corp.,6' the Supreme Court suggested the
following factors-taken from Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)(A)-
(C)-for determining "whether the class action is the superior procedural vehicle
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy" (emphasis added):
(1) "[T]he interest of class members in controlling the prosecution of
individual actions." This factor takes into consideration cases where
individual members may have peculiar interests in maintaining
individual actions where they can maintain control of their own suit, as
where the individual class members have all suffered severe damages or,
in the case of defendant classes, are faced with serious claims.16'
(2) "[Tlhe extent and nature of litigation already begun by the class
members." As explained by the court in Guste, "a class action is more
useful when only a limited number of additional suits has been
filed."'
62
(3) "[T]he desirability of concentrating the litigation in one forum."
This third factor concerns the convenience of litigants and witnesses, the
availability of evidence, and the like.
(4) "[T]he difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action." The court in Guste had this to say about the "manage-
ability" requirement:
159. Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 703 So. 2d 542, 545, 548 (La. 1997).
160. 370 So. 2d 477, 489 (La. 1978).
161. See, e.g., McCastle, 456 So. 2d at 621; see also Dumas v. Angus Chem. Co., 635 So. 2d
446, 452 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994); Spitzfaden v. Dow Coming Corp., 619 So. 2d 795, 798 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1993).
162. Guste, 370 So. 2d at 490; see McCastle, 456 So. 2d at 620.
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[W]e indicated in Williams that "assuring reasonable notice of
incidental episodes in the litigation, as well as. . . distributing
any recovery, if awarded," 350 So.2d 131, 136 involved in
weighing class manageability.'63
The foregoing factors are by no means exhaustive. Indeed, in McCastle v.
Rollins Environmental Services, the Louisiana Supreme Court regrouped the
foregoing elements of the "common character" analysis under three headings:
(1) Effectuating Substantive Law; (2) Judicial Efficiency; and (3) Fairness of the
Parties.' In addition, courts may wish to consider other factors, such as the
risk of prejudice from separate suits either yielding inconsistent adjudications that
could subject a single defendant to irreconcilable standards of conduct, or giving
rise to estoppel issues that could affect rights or claims individual to certain class
members.
The evolution of the jurisprudence in Louisiana addressing the "common
character" inquiry is marked by the court's struggle to determine exactly where
the compromise between "true" class actions and the far more amorphous
categories of class actions addressed under the pre-1966 version of Rule 23
property should lie. The difficulty of this process is illustrated by two 1970
decisions rendered by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: Caswell
v. Reserve National Insurance Co.,' 6 and Veal v. Preferred Thrift & Loan of
New Orleans, Inc.'"
In Caswell, the plaintiff attempted to bring a putative class action against an
insurer that allegedly included in its form health insurance policies a provision
allowing for cancellation and renewal of the policy at the option of the insurer,
which discretion the insurer apparently had attempted to exploit to force its
insureds to execute riders excluding future coverage for catastrophic illnesses
suffered during the term of their policies. 67
The fourth circuit, focusing upon the categories of true, spurious, and hybrid
class actions created under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 (1966), construed
Article 591 (1997) et seq. to ban all but the "true" class action, which the court
defined as "one in which except for the use of the class action the joinder of all
interested parties would be necessary for the enforcement of the joint or common
163. Guste, 370 So. 2d at 489; cf. Metropolitan New Orleans Chapter of La. Consumers'
League, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 391 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ
denied, 396 So. 2d 898, 899 (1981). Numerous other factors may be relevant to the inquiry,
including the size of the proposed class, the. complexity and/or number of anticipated legal and
evidentiary issues, and the likelihood of additional parties or claims via intervention and incidental
demands.
164. 456 So. 2d at 619-21.
165. 234 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 236 So. 2d 499 (1970).
166. 234 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
167. Caswell. 234 So. 2d at 251-52.
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right.'"" Employing this confused construction of Article 591,69 the court
refused to uphold certification of the putative class before it:
The alleged facts and circumstances presented in this case fail to meet
the test of a true class action. The most that can be assumed from
plaintiff Caswell's allegations is that there probably are other policy-
holders whose contract of insurance was on a printed form similar to
that initially issued to him and that as to some of them the company
might have exercised its option to refuse renewal or to renew with
exclusion. The facts in each such case, if any, will differ in many
respects and a judgment on Caswell's demands could not conceivably
conclude the rights of other policy holders. At most, they have a
common interest in a question of law, a decision concerning which
would have value as a judicial precedent only. All policy holders
interested in the common question of law may join in Caswell's suit,
but they are not required to do so. This might be categorized as a
"spurious" class action, but it certainly is not a "true" class action
authorized by LSA-C.C.P. art. 591.70
The same day that it decided Caswell, the Fourth Circuit also decided Veal
v. Preferred Thrift & Loan of New Orleans, Inc.' The Veal case concerned
a putative class action predicated upon a form loan agreement used by the
defendant bank, which the plaintiff alleged contained impermissible open-ended
fee provisions that had been used by the defendant to charge illegal late fees.
172
The Fourth Circuit adopted its reasoning from Caswell and denied certification
to the proposed class because it was not a "true" class action:
There may be, and indeed there quite probably are, other persons who
have been or may be subjected by this defendant to "late charges" or
"extension fees" of which plaintiff Veal complaints, but we cannot
conceive of any judgment which might be rendered in this case which
would be conclusive of the rights of such persons. As in Caswell, this
suit may be an invitation to other persons similarly situated to join the
action, each on an individual basis for the adjudication of such "several"
right as each may have against the common defendant. Only such
parties as actually join the action will be concluded, and failure or
success of the action will not affect the rights of any party not joined.
A decision of the question of law common to all personswho have
borrowed money from this defendant or any other lending agency which
168. Id. at 255-56.
169. The fourth circuit, although recognizing that the Code's redactors and rejected the
categories under old Rule 23, nonetheless used those categories to construe Article 591 (1997).
170. Veal, 234 So.2d at 257.
171. 234 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
172. Id. at 229-30.
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imposes late charges or extension fees, will, at most, have only such
effect as that usually given to judicial precedent.'
In Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of City of Shreve-
port,"' the Louisiana Supreme Court specifically cited Caswell as an example
of an improper construction of Article 591 (1997), concluding that while it was
clear that the redactors of those articles had rejected the categories articulated in
the original version of Rule 23, they did not simultaneously and arbitrarily adopt
the narrow "true" class action category as the only permissible class action in
Louisiana:
Based upon the intention to adopt only the true class action, the Fourth
Circuit held: "The true class action is one in which except for the use
of the class action the joinder of all interested parties would be
necessary for the enforcement of the joint or common right." Caswell
v. Reserve National Insurance Co., La. App., 234 So.2d 250, 255-56
(1970).
The original federal class action from which our Article 591 was
adapted provided for three kinds of class actions, the so-called "true,"
"hybrid,". and "spurious." The hybrid and spurious class actions
generally required no more convexity between the rights of the
representative and of the absent members than the existence of a
common question of law or fact, whereas the true class action required
a stronger relationship between the claims. Thus, we are satisfied that,
in rejecting the hybrid and spurious class actions our legislature
intended that there be a relationship between the claims greater than
simply that of sharing a common question of law or fact.
The thrust of the 1966 revision of the federal class action was to
recognize the difficulty of applying a conceptual test to a problem
which demands a pragmatic approach. In essence, the federal rule
makers have left much discretion to the trial judge in ascertaining
whether a 'lass action should be maintained, but they have given the
judge a number of guidelines to aid him in determining how the
discretion should be exercised.
These guidelines emphasize limiting the use of the class action-when
a common-based right is at issue and other requirements are met (such
as too-numerous parties to join and adequate representation of the
class)-to occasions where the class action will be clearly more useful
than other available procedures for definitive determination of a
common-based right, If such definitive determination in the single
173. Id. at 230-31.
174. 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975).
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proceedings Should be afforded in the interests of the parties (including
both the class and the opponent(s) to it) and of the efficient operation
of the judicial system.
In determining how the legislature intended the courts to define and
apply the concept of allowing a class action to enforce rights with a
common character, we are mindful of the basic goals or aims of any
procedural device: to implement the substantive law, and to implement
that law in a manner which will provide maximum fairness to all parties
with a minimum expenditure of judicial effort. Implicit, then, in
decision that rights are of a common character is a consideration of the
extent to which a clear legislative policy might be thwarted, or
hampered in its implementation, by the lack of availability of the class
action device.
But this does not end the inquiry. Fairness to the parties demands at the
least that the relationship between the claims of members of the class
should be examined to determine whether it would be unfair to the
members of the class, or to the party opposing the class, to permit
separate adjudication of the claims. In determining whether it would be
unfair to require separate adjudications, for instance, the courts should
consider the precedential value of the first decision, as well as the extent
of injustice that will be produced by inconsistent judgments in separate
actions. Another factor to be considered, for example, is the size of the
claims of the absent members of the class, for the greater the claim, the
greater the interest of its owner in prosecuting it in a separate ac-
tion.'"
Significantly, although the court rejected the Caswell test, it declined to go so far
as to question the result reached in Caswell and Veal:
Although the result may (or may not) have been correct under the facts
of each particular case, the test adopted by these decisions negates the
availability of the class action in all cases except where indispensable
(or perhaps necessary) parties are too numerous to be joined. For
reasons to be stated, in our view this stringent test was not intended by
the legislature.
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A decade after Stevens, in Bergeron v. A VCO Financial Services of New
Orleans,'" the fourth circuit was again presented with a putative class action
predicated upon allegations that a lender had engaged in a common course of
conduct that resulted in excessive late charges and/or usurious interest rates.
Specifically recognizing that the methodology it had employed in Veal and
175. Stevens v. Board of Trustees, 309 So. 2d 144, 149-51 (La. 1975).
176. Id. at 147.
177. 468 So. 2d 1250 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 474 So. 2d 1308 (1985).
1998] ,1125
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Caswell had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Stevens in favor of the
"common character" inquiry, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless refused once again
to certify the class:
We believe Stevens means that a "common based right" exists when the
class shares a common question of law or fact, not that the facts must
be identical. Moreover, even though different recoveries may be sought
because of different facts, this alone would not justify denial of a class
certification when there are factually similar financial transactions and
a common question of law-usury. However, even though we believe
there exists a common based right, this does not end the inquiry, nor
does it mean a class should have been certified. Other questions
remain.
First, we are not at all sure that efficiency, a policy factor to be
considered, warrants certification. There is no evidence of other suits
against Avco of a similar nature; a multitude of suits cannot be
reasonably anticipated in this instance. And the basic goals or aims of
class actions, as of other procedural devices, are to "implement the
substantive law, and to implement that law in a manner which will
provide maximum fairness to all parties with a minimum expenditure
of judicial effort." Stevens, supra, at 151. Judicial efficiency means
consideration of the existence of, or likelihood or improbability of,
future similar suits-a judgment decision which the Trial Court is best
able to make. In the instant case we cannot say a class certification
would result in judicial efficiency because we do not believe numerous
suits can reasonably be anticipated, for reasons to be next discussed.
We are more concerned with a peculiar characteristic "we believe is
shared by the majority of members of the alleged class; that characteris-
tic is the borrower's desire that financial transactions remain confiden-
tial. People have an expectation of privacy as to their finances in
general, to their incomes, expenditures, and most of all, to their loans.
The Bergerons decided to forego privacy and file suit, but we are not
at all certain other customers of Avco would make the same decision.
As a matter offact, no other suits have been filed. To certify this as a
class action and to permit the broad discovery sought by the Bergerons
is to make public that which other customers of Avco more likely
believed would remain confidential: their loan, the amount of the loan,
the interest charges, even their delinquent payments, and perhaps more.
Most people do not want these matters placed in the public view.
This peculiar characteristic distinguishes this alleged class from others
such as policemen,firemen, school teachers, union members, and public
employees, classes that readily come to mind whose members would not
object to disclosure of their membership.
People expect privacy in financial matters, and because of this peculiar
characteristic, we believe a strong public policy factor-the right to
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privacy-would support a decision not to certify the class. Hence,. we
conclude that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
discovery and certification.
On the surface this decision may appear to insulate financial institutions
from class actions. However, we believe other means are available to
establish a class action, including, but not limited to, discreet advertise-
ment, which may produce members of the class who wish to forego
confidentiality and join the suit.' 8
Recently, however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals cited the reasoning of
Caswell with approval as support for its decision to deny certification to a class
of plaintiffs consisting of 700 to 1000 tenants in apartment complexes owned by
four defendants who allegedly violated Louisiana law by refusing to attempt
timely repairs, pro rate rent, and/or allow revocation of leases in the aftermath
of a severe flood in and around New Orleans.'79 Specifically, the Pulver court
felt that the common character requirement could not be met in that case because
class members "would have an option to either demand a diminution of [their
rent] or a revocation of the lease" if they were successful on individual claims,
while "[a]llowing a class action to proceed ... would bind all class members to
the relief selected by the class representatives, whether that is the type of relief
the individual class member in fact wanted."'80
As noted above, under Stevens, the amount or type of remedy sought by
class members is not a relevant factor, so long as there is a "common character"
between the two actions, an inquiry which focuses upon the predominance of
common questions of fact and law and the superiority of employing the class
action proceeding." ' And even in Caldwell, which in effect adopted the test
for mandatory joinder-requiring a strict identity of factual and legal issues-as
the standard for permissible class actions, there was no requirement that all class
members seek identical relief. 2 Thus, there is still no shortage of confusion
in the case law with respect to when certification is appropriate, particularly in
cases involving contractual rights and remedies.
In September of this year, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Ford v.
Murphy Oil US.A., Inc."s3 In that case, the supreme court spoke again to the
common character requisite for class certification: s'
178. Id. at 1253-54; see also Terrebonne Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacombe, 510 So. 2d 78 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1987) (following Bergeron).
179. Pulver v. 1st Lake Properties, Inc., 681 So. 2d 965 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996).
180. Id. at 969 (citing Caswell v. Reserve National Insurance Co., 234 So. 2d 250, 257 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1970)).
181. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
183. Ford v. Murphy Oil Co., 703 So. 2d 542 (La. 1997).
184. In doing so, the court made several statements that appear to confuse analysis. Most
curious of these is the following:
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In discussing the term "common character of the right sought to be
enforced" [in Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund], we
looked to the federal rules and noticed that those rules were revised in
1966 because of the "difficulty of characterization required by this term
of indefinite and imprecise meaning" and to describe "in more practical
terms the occasions for maintaining class actions." We thus adopted
what we then called the "discretionary grant" given to trial judges in
amended Federal Rule 23(b) as guidelines to be used by Louisiana
courts in determining whether to allow a class action... . In addition,
we summarized the intertwined values of effectuating substantive law,
judicial efficiency, and individual fairness involved in allowing a class
action.... In sum, in Stevens we substantially liberalized the availabil-
ity of class actions under Louisiana law by giving judges wide
discretion in determining whether to allow class actions using the
factors listed in Rule 23(b) and the "fairness" factors enumerated in
Stevens, rather than following the legislative intent of allowing only
"true" class actions." 5
In applying this standard for evaluating the common character of the suit
before it, the Ford court found that certification was not appropriate.""6 The
class in Ford, consisting of property owners living near four major petrochemical
plants outside of New Orleans, complained that the defendant companies "caused
or contributed ... to a condition or situation which significantly and materially
affected and/or adversely affected. . . petitioners' legally protectable rights by
virtue of synergistic accumulation or combination of releases, emissions,
disbursements, placement, seepage,- drainage, migration, or otherwise non-
consensual placing of pollutants on the exclusive properties or persons of
Although an action may be maintained as a class action in federal court when all the
requirements of 23(a) are met and just one of the requirements of 23(b) are met, in
Stevens we directed Louisiana courts to consider every requirement of 23(b) in
determining whether to allow a class action.
Id. at 547. As discussed above, Sections (bXl)-(3) were intended to address unique situations; while
there is certainly overlap, the special opt-out provisions of these subsections means that the analysis
appropriate under each of them is by no means co-extensive. Cf. DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co.,
64 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Crehan v. DeBoer, 116 S. Ct. 1544
(1996); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th Cir. 1989).
Presumably, the supreme court merely wanted to make it clear that Louisiana will recognize class
actions equivalent to those qualifying under Rules 23(b)(I ) and (b)(2), rather than to limit class
actions in Louisiana solely to those that would qualify under all three (assuming one can imagine
such a claim). This is, again, consistent with the prevailing opinion that Rule 23(bX3) represents a
broad rule of general application, while Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) are rules of specific application.
185. Id. at 546. Again, I think the court does not really mean what it says; that is, it does not
really believe itself to be contradicting express legislative intent in incorporating the analysis
developed in federal case law under Rule 23(b) into the proper inquiry under Article 591 et seq.




petitioners" which, although the defendants' emissions individually met all
Louisiana DEQ and Federal Clean Air Act standards, in combination constituted
a nuisance."'
In denying certification, the Ford court, citing to Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor,8 8 focused upon a lack of uniformity within the class as to the
substantive issues of causation and liability:
However, far from offering the same facts, each class member will
necessarily have to offer different facts to establish that certain
defendants' emissions, either individually or in combination, caused
them specific damages on yet unspecified dates (which dates may run
into the hundreds or even thousands). The causation issue is even more
complicated considering the widely divergent types of personal,
property and business damages claimed and considering each plaintiffs'
unique habits, exposures, length of exposures, medications, medical
conditions, employment, and location of residence or business. In
addition, each plaintiff will have to prove that the specific harm he
suffered surpassed the level of inconvenience that is tolerated under
[Louisiana's nuisance laws). By the very nature of the claims that have
been made, the length of time involved, and the vast geographical area
in which the class members live, the degree of inconvenience or damage
suffered will vary greatly as to the individual plaintiffs. Lastly, the
mere finding of "defendants' duty" not to pollute will do little to
advance the issues in this case. There appear to be far too many
individual liability issues which could not be tried separately, as that is
prohibited by article 593.1(C)(1). As aptly stated by Judge Schott in his
dissent, "[o]ne plaintiff cannot prove individual causation and individual
damage based on the exposure of another plaintiff to a particular
emission." The individualistic causation and liability issues are further
magnified in this case by the claim that four different sources of
emissions are involved.' 89
The court in Ford also adopted the "novel and immature" tort analysis from
Castano, concluding that the plaintiff's "synergistic combination" theory (by
which several different defendants' individual emissions may combine to create
187. Id. at 542-44.
188. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). In Amchem. the Supreme Court decertificd a settlement class in
a nationwide asbestos class action, explaining that:
Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different
amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods. Some class members
suffer no physical injury or have only asymptonatic pleural changes, while others suffer
from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from rnesothelioma .... Each has a different
history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry....
Amchem Prods.. Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 2250, cited by Ford, 703 So. 2d at 549.
189. Ford, 702 So. 2d at 548-49 (citations omitted).
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an actionable nuisance) was so novel and untested as to prevent a court from
properly conducting a predominance inquiry."9 The Ford court's construction
of Castano appears to be somewhat expansive. In Castano, the Fifth Circuit
focused upon the novelty of addiction as an actionable injury in tort. 9' The
plaintiffs in Ford, however, neither asserted a novel cause of action (they
complained of a nuisance), 92 nor did they complain of a novel injury (they
asserted physical injuries and property damages common to pollution cases). The
Ford court's concerns were instead with the adequacy of the plaintiff's causation
theory, which under Louisiana law could have been readily addressed with
existing doctrine on that issue.
III. CONCLUSION
By adopting the post-1966 version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
the Louisiana legislature has clearly given the state's courts an opportunity to
clarify a rather disjointed and even confusing thirty-seven years worth of
piecemeal case law. The legislature has not, however, removed confusion from
this rapidly evolving area of the law. Indeed, with sweeping revisions to the
existing Rule 23 long since on the drawing board, Louisiana courts may soon
find themselves in the same position they were in after the 1966 revisions to
Rule 23, a mere six years after Louisiana enacted its Class Action Statute based
upon the 1937 version of that rule. Given the power of the class action, change
and innovation are inevitable, and our courts and legislatures must continue to
keep apace of development to keep this procedural device from overwhelming
the system that created it.
190. Id.
191. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
1.92. Compare In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting
a novel theory of liability dubbed the "serendipity" theory by the court).
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